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Introduction 
On February 8, 2018, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) delivered its judgment 
on whether the principles of transparency, equal treatment and non-discrimination 
preclude national legislation which allows the simultaneous participation in the same 
tendering procedure of several syndicates of Lloyd’s of London, whose tenders are 
signed by a single person. The case is interesting primarily because of its practical 
implications for contracting authorities that have an interest in excluding candidates 
or tenderers in case of potential intra-group collusion. In other words, this case will 
have an impact on the exposure of contracting authorities to bid rigging, which is a 
very deliberate breach of the law that involves the overpaying of tax payers’ funds 
and raises prices artificially between 6 and 48 per cent above the competitive level.1 
Additionally, the Lloyd’s of London v Arpacal judgment clarifies whether the 
participation of related undertakings in a common tendering procedure for the award 
of a public contract is a reason or not for their automatic exclusion from the call for 
tenders.   
Facts 
Calabria Regional Environmental Protection Agency, Italy (“Arpacal”) is an Italian 
environmental agency, whose main task is the natural protection of Calabria and the 
verification of environmental regulations. On 13 August 2015, Arpacal launched an 
open tendering procedure for the award of a contract for insurance cover services, 
with a view to covering risk linked to the agency’s civil liability towards third parties 
and workers for the period covering the years 2016 to 2018. The public contract 
would be awarded on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender 
(MEAT) criterion, meaning on a price-quality basis that generally enables contracting 
authorities to ask from suppliers not only low prices but also technical requirements 
that ensure a specific standard of quality for the products/services procured.  
                                                          
* PhD candidate in Competition and Public Procurement Law, Centre for Competition Policy (“CCP”), 
University of East Anglia. 
1 Commission, Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of 
the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2008) 165 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008SC0404&from=EN (accessed 20 December 2018); J.B. 
Baker The Case for Antitrust Enforcement (2003) 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 27, 29; 
Competition and Markets Authority Local Authorities and Competition, 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/669668/local_authorities_and_
competition_final_report.pdf (accessed 27 Dec. 2017), p. 10; I. Apostolakis, Antitrust Liability in 
Cases of Indirect Contacts between Competitors: VM Remonts, (2017) 54  CMLR, 609. 
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Lloyd’s of London (“Lloyd’s”) is a leading insurance platform/market providing 
specialist insurance service to businesses, people and communities in more than 200 
countries and territories. It is composed of insurance companies, limited partnerships, 
individuals and other entities, which group together and form specialist syndicates 
that underwrite insurance policies.2 Each syndicate maintains and staffs a physical 
office or stall on the premises of the Lloyd’s Market at Lloyd’s headquarters in 
London.3 Each syndicate is given a number by Lloyd’s to identify them.   
Upon Arpacal’s call for tender on 13 August 2015, two Lloyd’s syndicates, Arch 
Underwriting at Lloyd’s Ltd and Tokio Marine Kiln Syndicates Limited, participated 
in the open tendering procedure by submitting their bids. Both bids were signed by 
the Special Agent of Lloyd’s General Representative for Italy. In view of the fact that 
both bids were attributable to a single decision-making centre, Arpacal excluded the 
two syndicates from the procedure, in virtue of article 38(1)(m), quarter, of 
Legislative Decree No 163/2006. 4  The Special Agent of Lloyd’s General 
Representative for Italy challenged Arpacal’s administrative decisions before the 
Regional Administrative Court of Calabria, Italy (“Regional Court”) and as a result 
the Regional Court censured them and ordered the readmission of the two syndicates 
to the tendering procedure. Despite the Court’s order, on 14 December 2016 Arpacal 
excluded again the two syndicates from the procedure on the same grounds. Still 
through its General Representative for Italy, Lloyd’s brought fresh proceedings 
against Arpacal’s decision before the Regional Court. Lloyd’s  argued that it is a 
collective legal person with multiple structures, which is composed of natural and 
legal persons that act independently within syndicates. 5  Lloyd’s syndicates are 
individual groups which operate independently from one another and in competition 
with one another even if they belong to the same organization.6 Moreover, none of the 
internal structures has autonomous legal personality but acts through the General 
Representative who, for each country, is the sole representative for all syndicates 
operating in that territory. The General Representative confines himself to 
transmitting on headed paper, without taking part in the decision-making process of 
each syndicate, the content of the model response to a call for tenders and standard 
forms completed and approved by each syndicate.7 
                                                          
2 Lincoln Adventures, LLC v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd’s of London, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
136684 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2017).  
3 ibid. 
4 Article 38(1)(m), quarter, of that legislative decree contemplated that tenders which are in relation to 
another participant in the same tendering procedure, in a situation of control for the purposes of article 
2359 of the Codice Civile (Civil Code) or in any relationship, including a de facto relationship, where 
the situation of control or relationship means that the tenders are attributable to a single decision-
making centre would be excluded from participation in a procedure for the award  of concessions and 
of public works, supply and service contracts, and could not conclude contracts pertaining thereto or 
sub-contracts. 
5 Case C-144/17 Lloyd’s of London v Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione dell’ Ambiente della 
Calabria ECLI:EU:C:2018:78, para. 17.  
6 ibid. 
7 ibid, para. 43. 
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On the other hand, Arpacal argued that there are several factors suggesting that 
tenders are attributable to a single decision-making centre. First of all, identical forms 
were used for submitting the tenders.8 Secondly, it was the same person, namely the 
Special Agent of the General Representative for Italy, who signed the tenders of both 
Lloyd’s syndicates. 9  Thirdly, the official stamps on both financial tenders were 
bearing consecutive numbers. 10  Fourthly, the statements and declarations were 
identical in both tenders submitted by Lloyd’s syndicates. 11 For all these reasons, 
Arpacal - the relevant contracting authority- held that there was infringement of the 
principles of confidentiality of tenders, fair and free competition and equal treatment 
of tenderers, as the Special Agent of that Representative must have been aware of the 
content of the tenders submitted by Lloyd’s syndicates.  
The Regional Court upheld Lloyd’s action through its General Representative for 
Italy, on the ground that the particular structure of Lloyd’s operates in different 
countries through a single General Representative in accordance with United 
Kingdom rules and regulations. Likewise, the Supervisory Authority for Public 
Contracts in Italy opined that the independence of syndicates and competition 
between them serve to ensure free competition and the equal treatment of candidates. 
Therefore, it was held that there was no infringement either of Article 38(1)(m), 
quater, and (2) 12  of Legislative Decree No 163/2006, or of the principles of 
competition, independence and the confidentiality of tenders. However, the Regional 
Court decided to stay the proceedings and ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, 
uncertain as it was about whether the principles of transparency, equal treatment and 
non-discrimination, which derive from articles 49 and 56 TFEU and are referred to in 
article 2 of Directive 2004/18, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a 
Member State which does not allow two syndicates of Lloyd’s to be excluded from 
participation in the same procedure for the award of a public service contract for 
insurance merely because their tenders were each signed by Lloyd’s General 
Representative for that Member State.13 
 
                                                          




12 Article 38(2) of the Legislative Decree No 163/2006 contemplated that for the purposes of paragraph 
(1)(m) quater, the tenderer shall attach one of the following declarations: (a) a declaration that it is not 
in a situation of control for the purposes of Article 2359 of the Civil Code in relation to any person, and 
that it is submitting the tender independently; (b) a declaration that it is not aware of the participation in 
the procedure of persons that are, in relation to the tenderer, in any of the situations of control referred 
to in Article 2359 of the Civil Code, and that it is submitting the tender independently. In the situations 
described in points (a) and (b), the contracting authority shall exclude those tenderers in respect of 
which it establishes that the tenders are attributable to a single decision-making centre, on the basis of 
unambiguous evidence. Verification shall take place and any tenders be excluded after the opening of 
the envelopes containing the financial bid.  
13 Case C-144/17 Lloyd’s of London v Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione dell’ Ambiente della 




Despite the fact that the new Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement was 
adopted on 26 February 2014, i.e. before the tendering procedure at issue was 
launched on 13 August 2015, it is the old Directive 2004/18/EU on the coordination 
of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and 
public service contracts that applies ratione temporis to the main proceedings, as the 
time period for the transposition of the new Directive 2014/24/EU expired on 18 April 
2016. Hence, according to the old Directive and specifically based on article 45 that 
specifies the grounds for the exclusion of an economic operator from participation in 
a tendering procedure, the membership of entities in the same organization does not 
constitute a ground for their exclusion in order to prevent any risk of collusion 
between them. This is so because the approach of the European legislator was to 
adopt only grounds for exclusion based on the objective findings of facts or conduct 
specific to the contractor concerned, such as to cast discredit on his professional 
reputation or call into question his economic or financial ability to complete the works 
covered by the public contract for which he is tendering.14 However, since the nature 
of the grounds for exclusion under article 45 of Directive 2004/18/EU is 
discretionary, there is always the possibility of Member States to maintain or establish 
in addition to those grounds for exclusion, substantive rules intended to ensure, as 
regards public contracts, observance of the principles of equal treatment of all 
tenderers and of transparency, provided that the principle of proportionality is 
observed.15 Based on this possibility, Italy adopted legislation such as that at issue, 
i.e. the Legislative Decree No 163/2006, in order to prevent any potential collusion 
between participants in the same procedure for the award of a public contract. Yet, in 
any case this legislation must not infringe the principle of proportionality by going 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the intended objective.16 
By enabling the automatic exclusion of candidates or tenderers that are in a 
relationship of control or of association with other competitors, the ECJ held that the 
contracting authority goes beyond what is necessary to prevent collusive behaviour 
and to ensure the application of the principle of equal treatment and compliance with 
the obligation of transparency. 17  Such an automatic exclusion would be an 
irrebuttable presumption of mutual interference in the respective tenders, for the same 
contract, of undertakings linked by a relationship of control or of association.18  This 
would also mean that the relevant candidates or tenderers would not be able to 
                                                          
14  Case C-213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, Ipourgos Epikratias 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:731, para. 42. 
15 Case C-538/07 Assitur Srl v Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Milano 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:317, para. 21. 
16 ibid, para. 23-24; Case C-376/08 Serrantoni Srl v Consorzio stabile edili Scrl ECLI:EU:C:2009:808, 
para. 33; Case C-425/14 Impresa Edilux Srl v Societa Italiana Costruzioni e Forniture Srl (SICEF) 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:721, para. 29. 
17 Case C-144/17 Lloyd’s of London v Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione dell’ Ambiente della Calabria 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:78, para. 35. 
18 ibid, para. 36. 
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produce evidence before the relevant contracting authority to show the opposite, 
namely that their tenders are independent. Further, the ECJ clarified that the automatic 
exclusion of candidates or tenderers and all that goes with it would prohibit the widest 
possible participation by tenderers in a call for tenders.19 Therefore, the mere fact that 
tenders such as those in the main proceedings have been signed by the same person, 
meaning the Special Agent of Lloyd’s General Representative for Italy, cannot justify 
per se the automatic exclusion of Lloyd’s syndicates from the tendering procedure at 
issue. 20  Consequently, the principles of transparency, equal treatment and non-
discrimination do not preclude legislation of a Member State, which does not allow 
two syndicates of Lloyd’s of London to be excluded from participation in the same 
procedure for the award of a public service contract for insurance merely because 
their respective tenders were each signed by the General Representative of Lloyd’s of 
London for that Member State but instead allows their exclusion if there are 
unambiguous evidence that their tenders were not drawn up independently.21  
Comments 
The ECJ saw in the preliminary question submitted by the Regional Court a great 
opportunity to clarify that the systematic exclusion of bidders from procurement 
procedures merely because they are in a relationship of control or of association with 
other competitors should not narrow the market before assessing first the facts of each 
case. This ruling complies with the rationale of the old Directive 2004/18/EU, which 
does not contain any provision prohibiting in the first place the participation of related 
undertakings in a public procurement procedure.  Likewise, the new Directive 
2014/24/EU does not contemplate the exclusion of linked tenderers from the same 
public tender process, though it did go even further by adding an explicit competition 
ground for excluding competition law offenders from procurement process, 
emphasizing in this way the need to protect public markets from anticompetitive 
activities, such as bid rigging.22  
The significance of such an ascertainment becomes particularly apparent in case of 
public markets with characteristics supporting collusion. It is likely that in such cases 
there will be a small number of companies remaining to deliver the public contract 
successfully. An illustrative example is the construction industry where 103 
companies in the UK were found to have breached competition law in 2009 by getting 
                                                          
19 ibid; Case C-538/07 Assitur Srl v Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di 
Milano ECLI:EU:C:2009:317, para. 29-30; Case C-376/08 Serrantoni Srl v Consorzio stabile edili Scrl 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:808, para. 39-40; Case C-425/14 Impresa Edilux Srl v Societa Italiana Costruzioni e 
Forniture Srl (SICEF) ECLI:EU:C:2015:721, para. 36.  
20 Case C-144/17 Lloyd’s of London v Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione dell’ Ambiente della 
Calabria ECLI:EU:C:2018:78, para. 39.  
21 ibid, para. 46.  
22 According to the new exclusion ground that was added in Article 57, para.4 (d) of the Directive 
2014/24/EU, contracting authorities may exclude or may be required by Member States to exclude 
from participation in a procurement procedure any economic operator, where the contracting authority 
has sufficiently plausible indications to conclude that the economic operator has entered into 
agreements with other economic operators aimed at distorting competition. 
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involved in cover pricing.23 In the relevant decision report, the Office of Fair Trading 
(“OFT”) stated that if all infringers were excluded from tender lists, the public sector 
would struggle to find bidders to carry out the work, as cover pricing in the 
construction industry is a “widespread and endemic practice”. 24  Thus, if it were 
accepted that contracting authorities should be able to automatically exclude from 
procurement procedures bidders with a relationship of control or of association with 
other competitors regardless of their bids at issue, tender lists would become even 
shorter and this would be critical, as sometimes the relevant market turns out to be a 
monopoly. Of course this has always to do with the structure of the relevant market 
and it should be examined on a case by case basis.  
The robustness of the present judgment was confirmed in May 2018 when the ECJ 
considered the Specializuotas Transportas, a Lithuanian case where linked tenderers 
submitted separate offers in the same public tender process for waste management 
services.25 It was held that  when a contracting authority has evidence that calls into 
question the autonomous character of the tenders submitted by certain tenderers, it is 
obliged to examine all the relevant circumstances and request, where appropriate, 
additional information from those tenderers, whether their offers are in fact 
autonomous.26 This ruling is in line with the judgment at issue, as it presupposes the 
exclusion of the related tenderers only after the contracting authority assessed the 
evidence produced before it by the relevant tenderers. The only difference between 
these two cases is that in Specializuotas Transportas case the interrelation between 
the two tenderers was raised as an issue by another tenderer that did not manage to 
win the public award and not by the contracting authority as in Lloyd’s of London v 
Arpacal case. For this reason, the ECJ ruled that where evidence is produced before a 
contracting authority which challenges the autonomy of bids because they are 
submitted by related bidders, it has a duty to proactively investigate whether the offers 
made are autonomous and independent, requesting additional information from those 
bidders as appropriate.  
Another really interesting point that the ECJ made in Specializuotas Transportas case 
regards the standard of proof which is required in order to determine that a tender is 
neither autonomous nor independent. It was held that a breach of the EU rules 
governing public procurement may be proved not only by direct evidence, but also 
through indicia, as long as they are objective and consistent and under the condition 
                                                          
23  BBC “Building Companies fined £129.5m”˂ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8268116.stm˃ 
accessed on 20 December 2018. 
24 OFT “Competition Act 1998-Decision of OFT No.CA98/02/2009-Bid Rigging in the Construction 
Industry in England, 21 September 2009”˂ 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business
_leaflets/general/CE4327-04_Decision__public_1.pdf˃accessed on 20 December 2018. 
25 See Case C-531/16 Specializuotas Transportas, ECLI:EU:C:2017:883, where two of the tenderers in 
a public tender were subsidiaries of the same parent company sharing the same shareholder and 
management board directors. 
26 ibid, para. 27, 33. 
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that the related tenderers are in a position to submit evidence in rebuttal.27 Based on 
this finding, it would be sufficient for Arpacal to use indications, such as the fact that 
each syndicate maintains and staffs a physical office or stall on the premises of the 
Lloyd’s Market at Lloyd’s headquarters in London, in order to prove that their tenders 
were not drawn up independently.  
All in all, it could be said that Lloyd’s of London v Arpacal case puts some necessary 
restrictions to contracting authorities when it comes to the exclusion of related 
tenderers from the tendering procedure. In this way, it is underlined that the exclusion 
grounds in public procurement cannot be seen purely as an element of competition 




                                                          
27 ibid, para. 37. 
